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is%a%provision%that%allows%for%a%supermajority%of%creditors%to%vote%to%bind%the%entire%creditor%group%on%key%matters%such%as%the%amount%that%is%owed.%%The%reason%attention%has%been%paid%to%the%study%of%this%term%is%that%at%least%twice%over%the%past%two%decades,%major%policy%initiatives%have%been%undertaken%to%persuade%market%actors%that%the%adoption%of%these%terms%is%beneficial%to%them%and%to%the%system%as%a%whole.%The%first%initiative,%that%took%place%during%the%period%1995L2002,%was%to%urge%emerging%market%issuers%using%New%York%law%to%adopt%CACs%(that%were%used%as%a%matter%of%practice%by%issuers%in%the%English%law%market).%%The%initiative%was%successful%in%that%after%2003,%the%use%of%CACs%became%widespread%in%New%York%law%bonds%as%well%as%English%law%bonds.%%The%second%CAC%initiative%came%about%a%decade%later,%in%2013,%where%in%the%wake%of%the%Euro%area%debt%crisis,%there%were%widespread%calls%for%improvements%to%the%existing%CAC%template.%%A%question%that%was%raised%in%resistance%to%these%policy%initiatives,%unsurprisingly,%was%whether%these%contract%reforms%would%raise%the%cost%of%capital%for%borrowers.28%Oversimplifying,%there%have%been%three%generations%of%CAC%pricing%studies.%%The%first%generation%of%CAC%studies%done%around%1999L2000%utilized%comparisons%of%yields%on%English%law%governed%sovereign%bonds%to%those%on%the%New%York%law%governed%sovereign%bonds%and%concluded%that%the%difference%showed%the%pricing%impact%of%CACs.29%%The%key%(problematic)%assumption%was%that%since%English%law%bonds%typically%contained%CACs%and%the%New%York%law%ones%did%not,%the%yield%differentials%would%reflect%the%impact%of%CACs.%%The%bottom%line%of%these%initial%studies%was%that%CACs%did%not%impact%prices.%%The%second%generation%of%studies%was%more%sophisticated%in%terms%of%separating%out%the%sovereigns%in%terms%of%their%risk%characteristics%(positing%that%the%impact%of%CACs%on%pricing%would%depend%on%the%risk%level%of%the%issuer)%and%in%terms%of%the%quality%and%amount%of%data%used.%%This%time%some%studies%did%find%pricing%effects%(that%CACs%were%costly%for%the%weakest%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%28%See%Anna%Gelpern%&%Mitu%Gulati,%The(WonderGClause,%41%J.%Comp.%Econ.%367%(2013)%(describing%the%debates%over%CACs).%29%E.g.,Peter%Petas & Rafique Rahman, Sovereign Bonds – Legal Aspects that Affect Default and Recovery, Emerging 
Market Research, Deutsche Bank (May 1999); Kostas Tsatsaronis, The Effect of Collective Action Clauses on 
Sovereign Bond Yields, in International Banking and Financial Market Developments, Bank for International 
Settlements (1999); Liz Dixon & David Wall, Collective Action Problems and Collective Action Clauses, Financial 


























5.1(( Sovereign(Guarantor(Country(Fixed(Effects(Model(% As%a%starting%point,%we%utilize%a%sovereign%country%fixed%effects%model%to%assess%the%impact%of%the%Crisis%and%Post%Crisis%periods.%%The%strength%of%our%initial%fixed%effects%approach%is%that%it%controls%for%various%countryLspecific%factors%that%may%correlate%with%the%Spread.%%The%weakness%of%our%initial%approach%is%that%it%does%not%measure%the%differential%impact%of%the%Crisis%and%Post%Crisis%periods%on%different%countries%(for%example%Greece%compared%with%nonLEurope%countries).%%%Our%fixed%effects%model%only%captures%the%overall%impact%of%the%Crisis%and%Post%Crisis%periods%on%Spreads%for%guarantee%bonds%associated%with%all%sovereign%guarantor%countries%in%our%sample.%% We%estimate%the%following%fixed%effects%model%(using%sovereign%guarantor%country%effects)%with%the%log%of%1%plus%the%Spread%as%the%dependent%variable%and%errors%clustered%by%the%country%granting%the%guarantee%as%follows:%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%37%Elaine%Moore%&%Kerin%Hope,%Greece(Launches(Sale(of(FiveGYear(Bond,%Fin.%Times,%April%8,%2014;%Neelabh%Chaturvedi,%Greek(Bank(Issues(at(5.1%,(Really,%Wall%Street%J.,%March%18,%2014.%
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ln(1%+%Spread)i%%=%%+%ß1iln(Amount)i%%%%+%%ß2iInvestment%Gradei%%%+%%ß3iCrisisi%%%%+%%ß4iPost%Crisisi%%%+%%i%% In%our%first%model,%we%assess%the%relationship%between%the%dependent%variable%and%the%log%of%the%offering%amount%((ln(Amount))%and%whether%the%private%issuer%is%investment%grade%(=1)%or%not%(=0)%at%the%time%of%the%bond%issuance%(Investment%Grade).%%We%also%add%indicator%variables%for%the%Crisis%and%Post%Crisis%periods.%%Against%Crisis%and%Post%Crisis,%our%base%category%is%the%Pre%Crisis%period.%%Table%4%reports%summary%statistics%on%the%independent%variables%in%the%model%and%the%other%models%in%the%paper.%%%Model%1%of%Table%5%reports%the%results.%% Note%from%Model%1%of%Table%5%that%neither%the%coefficients%on%Crisis%and%Post%Crisis%are%significantly%different%from%zero.%%In%particular,%while%the%coefficient%on%Crisis%is%negative,%indicating%a%diminishing%Spread%in%the%Crisis%period,%this%coefficient%is%significant%at%only%the%21.1%%level,%beyond%conventional%statistical%significance.%%%% In%Model%2%of%Table%5,%we%add%indicator%variables%for%whether%the%guarantee%bond%terms%are%covered%by%a%foreign%law%regime%(Foreign%Law)%and%are%governed%by%a%CAC%(Bond%CAC)%or%Sovereign%Immunity%Waiver%(Sovereign%Immunity%Waiver).%%%Within%our%fixed%effects%framework,%variation%in%the%presence%of%such%terms%in%the%different%guarantee%bond%private%issuers%associated%with%the%same%sovereign%guarantor%country%allows%us%to%assess%the%impact%of%such%contract%terms%controlling%for%the%specific%characteristics%of%the%particular%sovereign.%%%In%Model%2,%the%coefficient%on%Foreign%Law%is%negative%and%significant%at%the%5%%level.%%Consistent%with%prior%research,%we%find%that%investors%prefer%guarantee%bonds%with%foreign%law%to%those%with%local%law.%%That%makes%sense%since%foreign%law%typically%gives%investors%greater%protections%than%local%law.%%%In%contrast,%the%coefficients%on%Bond%CAC%and%Sovereign%Immunity%Waiver%are%not%significantly%different%from%zero.%%Although%Bond%CAC%and%Sovereign%Immunity%Waiver%make%bonds%easier%to%restructure%may%cause%investors%to%view%such%bonds%as%riskier,%we%do%not%find%any%evidence%that%investors%price%such%differences%into%the%guarantee%bond%yields.%
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% In%sum,%we%find%that%at%least%one%contract%term,%Foreign%Law,%is%significantly%related%to%the%Spread.%%In%contrast,%we%do%not%find%strong%evidence%of%the%relationship%between%the%Spread%and%the%Crisis%or%Post%Crisis%periods.%%However,%our%fixed%effects%framework%does%not%allow%for%tests%of%the%differential%impact%of%the%Crisis%or%Post%Crisis%period%on%guarantee%bonds%from%specific%countries%most%affected%by%the%Crisis.%%%In%the%next%section,%we%use%a%differenceLinLdifference%framework%to%assess%this%differential%impact%for%specific%countries%including%in%particular%Greece.%% %






5.3( Crisis(Period(%% During%the%Crisis%period,%investors%focused%closely%on%Greece%and%the%Other%PIIGS%and%the%increasing%likelihood%during%this%period%that%these%countries%would%default%on%their%sovereign%obligations.%%%We%use%the%Crisis%period%to%assess%how%the%Spreads%changed%when%the%market’s%perception%of%a%particular%sovereign,%including%Greece%and%the%Other%PIIGS,%shifted%from%strong%to%weak.%%%% Table%3%reports%that%the%mean%Spread%in%the%Crisis%period%for%Greece%was%%L0.988%compared%with%a%Pre%Crisis%spread%of%L0.004%(difference%significant%at%the%5%%level),%representing%a%large%magnitude%9,840%basis%point%negative%shift%in%the%Spread%compared%with%Pre%Crisis%period.%%As%conditions%in%Greece%worsened,%investors%holding%guarantee%bonds%presumably%began%attaching%greater%value%to%their%contractual%right%to%call%the%guarantee%bonds—something%that%would%have%likely%helped%them%do%well%in%a%restructuring%as%compared%to%the%naked%sovereign%bonds.%From%Table%3%also%note%that%the%mean%Spread%in%the%Crisis%period%for%the%Other%PIIGS%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%39%To%see%if%the%foregoing%effect%was%localized%close%to%the%beginning%of%the%crisis%in%April%2010,%we%reLestimated%Model%1%only%for%bonds%issued%in%2008%up%to%the%end%of%the%Pre%Crisis%period%before%April%2010.%%The%coefficients%on%Greece,%Other%PIIGS,%and%NonLPIIGS%Europe%were%not%significantly%different%from%zero%in%the%models.%
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7.# #Conclusion:#The#Mystery#of#the#Piraeus#Bank#Bonds#% %Looking%back%at%the%Greek%restructuring%of%March%2012,%we%know%that%there%was%an%advantage%to%holding%Greek%guaranteed%bond%as%opposed%to%a%garden%variety%Greek%government%bond.%%%No%haircut%was%forced%on%the%former,%whereas%the%latter%got%an%80%%chop.%%If%one%looks%at%the%prices%of%guaranteed%bonds%versus%sovereign%bonds%from%the%Pre%Crisis%days,%investors%could%have%purchased%the%guaranteed%bonds%at%a%similar%or%lower%cost%than%the%sovereign%bonds,%suggesting%there%was%a%giant%arbitrage%opportunity%for%anyone%who%recognized%it.%%But%did%anyone%see%this%prior%to%March%2012%and,%if%so,%was%that%recognition%reflected%in%market%prices?%%%% Our%results%suggest%that,%at%least%for%Greece,%the%one%Euro%area%country%that%did%a%restructuring%of%its%sovereign%debt,%enough%investors%recognized%this%arbitrage%in%advance%of%the%actual%restructuring%that%the%advantage%was%reflected%in%prices.%%As%best%we%can%tell,%the%advantage%that%the%guaranteed%bonds%had%was%the%result%of%a%contract%right%they%had%that%the%ordinary%sovereign%bonds%did%not%have.%%Putting%two%
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Total# 1,030% 100.0%%% %
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Table#2#%
Year# Greece# Other#PIIGS# NonSPIiGS#
Europe#
Outside#Europe#
1990# 0% 1% 11% 6%
1991# 0% 0% 4% 5%
1992# 0% 2% 6% 11%
1993# 0% 0% 14% 13%
1994# 0% 0% 7% 9%
1995# 0% 0% 9% 7%
1996# 0% 0% 2% 15%
1997# 0% 0% 0% 10%
1998# 1% 3% 1% 6%
1999# 2% 1% 6% 8%
2000# 1% 1% 3% 13%
2001# 0% 3% 2% 3%
2002# 3% 3% 2% 10%
2003# 3% 3% 9% 8%
2004# 5% 3% 5% 9%
2005# 2% 2% 3% 5%
2006# 2% 3% 1% 7%
2007# 2% 2% 6% 6%
2008# 2% 7% 38% 4%
2009# 5% 96% 113% 33%
2010# 25% 54% 36% 8%
2011# 14% 48% 11% 10%
2012# 8% 107% 25% 18%
2013# 12% 15% 33% 17%










Greece# % % % % %
Pre#Crisis# 22% L0.004% LL% L0.001% LL%
Crisis# 39% L0.988% 0.029% L0.089% 0.000%
Post#Crisis# 6% 0.070% 0.000% 0.076% 0.000%
# % % % % %
Other#PIIGS# % % % % %
Pre#Crisis# 100% 0.005% LL% 0.005% LL%
Crisis# 146% 0.011% 0.001% 0.011% 0.000%
Post#Crisis# 28% 0.008% 0.074% 0.005% 0.443%
# % % % % %
NonSPIIGS#Europe# % % % %
Pre#Crisis# 178% 0.003% LL% 0.004% LL%
Crisis# 18% 0.000% 0.190% 0.001% 0.117%
Post#Crisis# 40% 0.002% 0.658% 0.002% 0.270%
# % % % %
Outside#Europe# % % % %
Pre#Crisis# 53% 0.019% LL% 0.014% LL%
Crisis# 7% 0.014% 0.613% 0.013% 0.704%




Variable# N# Mean# Median# Standard#
Deviation#
Amount#($#million)# 468% 4589.5% 500.0% 35779.0%
Investment#Grade# 651% 0.470% 0.000% 0.499%
Greece# 651% 0.103% 0.000% 0.304%
Other#PIIGS# 651% 0.421% 0.000% 0.494%
NonSPIIGS#Europe# 651% 0.363% 0.000% 0.481%
Foreign#Law# 551% 0.746% 1.000% 0.436%
Bond#CAC# 453% 0.662% 1.000% 0.473%
Sovereign#Immunity#
Waiver#




Table#5:##Sovereign#Country#Fixed#Effects#Model#of#Spread#% Model#1# Model#2#ln(Amount)% 0.001% L0.001%% (0.93)% (L1.19)%% % %Investment%Grade% L0.003% 0.001%% (L0.58)% (0.21)%% % %Crisis% L0.028% L0.023%% (L1.30)% (L1.15)%% % %Post%Crisis% L0.001% L0.004%% (L0.09)% (L1.14)%% % %Foreign%Law% % L0.015*%% % (L2.84)%% % %Bond%CAC% % 0.003%% % (0.65)%% % %Sovereign%Immunity%Waiver% % L0.003%% % (L0.37)%% % %Constant% 0.001% 0.022*%% (0.22)% (2.87)%




Table#6:##DifferenceSinSDifferences#Model#of#Spread#for#Pre#Crisis#Period#% Model#1# Model#2#ln(Amount)% 0.002% 0.001%% (1.57)% (1.59)%% % %Investment%Grade% 0.001% L0.001%% (0.24)% (L0.31)%% % %Greece% L0.020+% L0.009%% (L1.87)% (L1.60)%% % %Other%PIIGS% L0.017+% %% (L1.77)% %% % %NonLPIIGS%Europe% L0.016+% %% (L1.87)% %% % %Close%to%Junk% % L0.016**%% % (L4.47)%% % %Constant% 0.008% L0.001%% (0.52)% (L0.09)%





Periods#% Model#1% Model#2%ln(Amount)% 0.001% 0.001%% (1.52)% (1.69)%% % %Investment%Grade% 0.002% 0.001%% (0.79)% (0.38)%% % %Greece% L0.020+% L0.008%% (L1.88)% (L1.49)%% % %Other%PIIGS% L0.017+% %% (L1.78)% %% % %NonLPIIGS%Europe% L0.016+% %% (L1.91)% %% % %Close%to%Junk% % L0.017**%% % (L4.97)%% % %Crisis% L0.009% L0.001%% (L1.43)% (L0.40)%% % %Greece%% L0.072**% L0.079**%x%Crisis% (L9.48)% (L23.78)%% % %Other%PIIGS%% 0.013% %x%Crisis% (1.64)% %% % %NonLPIIGS%Europe%% 0.006% %x%Crisis% (0.92)% %% % %Close%to%Junk%% % 0.005%x%Crisis% % (1.27)%% % %Constant% 0.009% L0.001%% (0.59)% (L0.14)%
N% 371% 371%adj.%R2% 0.626% 0.599%
t%statistics%in%parentheses;%+%p%<%0.10,%*%p%<%0.05,%**%p%<%0.01.%%%Data%observations%are%individual%guarantee%bond%private%issuances.%%Errors%are%clustered%by%country%granting%the%guarantee.%%%Dependent%variable%is%the%log%of%1%+%Spread%Between%Private%Bond%and%Comparable%Sovereign%Bond.%%%ln(Amount)%is%the%log%of%the%offering%amount%for%the%guarantee%bond%issuance.%%Investment%Grade%is%equal%to%1%if%the%guarantee%bond%private%issuer%is%investment%grade%at%the%time%of%the%issuance%and%0%otherwise.%%Greece%is%equal%to%1%if%the%sovereign%guarantor%country%is%Greece%and%0%otherwise.%%Other%PIIGS%is%equal%to%1%if%the%sovereign%guarantor%country%is%Spain,%Portugal,%Ireland,%or%Italy%and%0%otherwise.%%NonLPIIGS%Europe%is%equal%to%1%if%the%sovereign%guarantor%country%is%in%Europe%but%is%not%Greece%or%an%Other%PIIGS%country%and%0%otherwise.%%Close%to%Junk%is%equal%to%1%if%S&P%rates%the%sovereign%(other%than%Greece)%as%less%than%5%rating%notches%above%the%highest%level%of%junk%status%at%the%time%of%a%particular%guarantee%bond%issuance%and%0%otherwise.%%Crisis%is%equal%to%1%if%the%guarantee%bond%issuance%was%between%March%2010%and%April%2012%and%0%otherwise.%% %
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Table#8:#DifferenceSinSDifferences#Model#of#Spread#for#All#Periods#% Model#1% Model#2%ln(Amount)% 0.001% 0.001%% (1.55)% (1.63)%% % %Investment%Grade% 0.002% 0.001%% (0.58)% (0.25)%% % %Greece% L0.020+% L0.008%% (L1.90)% (L1.61)%% % %Other%PIIGS% L0.017% %% (L1.73)% %% % %NonLPIIGS%Europe% L0.016+% %% (L1.82)% %% % %Close%to%Junk% % L0.017**%% % (L5.20)%% % %Crisis% L0.008% L0.001%% (L1.20)% (L0.37)%% % %Greece%% L0.073**% L0.079**%x%Crisis% (L9.19)% (L24.85)%% % %Other%PIIGS%% 0.013% %x%Crisis% (1.51)% %% % %NonLPIIGS%Europe%% 0.005% %x%Crisis% (0.70)% %% % %Close%to%Junk% % 0.005%x%Crisis% % (1.44)%% % %Post%Crisis% L0.017+% L0.003%% (L1.76)% (L0.69)%% % %Greece%% 0.084**% 0.072**%x%Post%Crisis% (7.41)% (13.51)%% % %Other%PIIGS%% 0.024*% %x%Post%Crisis% (2.29)% %% % %NonLPIIGS%Europe%% 0.017+% %x%Post%Crisis% (1.91)% %% % %Close%to%Junk% % 0.021**%x%Post%Crisis% % (3.78)%% % %Constant% 0.010% 0.000%% (0.70)% (0.02)%





Dataset name: Interest rate statistics (2004 EU Member States & ACCBs); Frequency: Monthly; Interest rate type: Long-
term interest rate for convergence purposes; Transaction type: Debt security issued; Maturity category: 10 years; BS
counterpart sector: Unspecified counterpart sector; Currency of transaction: Euro; IR business coverage: New business;
Interest rate type (fix/var): Unspecified
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Figure 7: Number of Issuances
